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Abstract  At the end of Republic V Socrates argues that differences between knowledge and opinion 
justify rule by philosophers in his ideal city; within this argument he gives a theory of powers. The 
theory contains a logical gap: Socrates mentions two criteria by which he individuates powers, yet 
assumes in his argument that both criteria will speak with a single voice. I argue that these criteria are 
two  ways  of  picking  out  a  power’s  manifestation—that is, the change a power is directed toward; I 
shall call this view the Identity Reading. Since they refer to a single phenomenon, the results of 
consulting both criteria cannot differ. The Identity Reading both solves the logical problem with the 
argument and sheds light on four other features of the passage. This reading also provides support for 
what  Gail  Fine  has  called  the  “contents  analysis”  of  a  power’s  relation  to  its  “objects,”  as  opposed  to  
the  “objects  analysis.” 
 
 
 
Toward the end of Republic V Socrates argues that the differences between 
knowledge and opinion justify rule by philosophers; within this argument he gives a theory of 
δυνάμεις,   or   “powers.”1 The theory contains a logical gap: Socrates says he looks at two 
criteria in order to individuate powers, generating four possible outcomes. Yet he assumes in 
his argument that both criteria will speak with a single voice, leaving only two possible cases. 
If this is a logical error, it passes unremarked and unjustified. But if it is not a mistake it has 
yet to be explained convincingly. I give a new account drawing on contemporary 
metaphysics: what Socrates looks at to individuate powers are two ways of picking out a 
power’s  manifestation — the change a power is directed toward.                                                          
1 I  use  “opinion”  as  equivalent  to  δόξα,  but  without  endorsing this against the competing translation 
“belief.”   For   recent   work   translating   δόξα   as   “belief,”   see   C.   J.   Rowe,   Plato and the Art of 
Philosophical Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Katja Maria Vogt, Belief and 
Truth  :  A  Skeptic Reading of Plato (New  York  ;;  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2012);;  Theodore  
Scaltsas,  “Knowledge  as  ‘True  Belief  Plus  Individuation’  in  Plato,”  Topoi 31.2 (November 17, 2012): 
137–49;;  opting  for  “opinion”  are     Grube,  G.  M.  A.  (translator,   revised  by  C.  D. C. Reeve), Plato’s  
Republic (Hackett  Publishing  Company,  1992);;  Joel  A.  Martinez,“Rethinking  Plato’s  Conception  of  
Knowledge: The Non-Philosopher   and   the   Forms,”   Apeiron 44.4 (2011): 326–334. I call this a 
“theory”  of  powers  on  the  grounds  that  Socrates  makes  three  important  and  connected  claims  about  
powers within a few lines: (1) powers exist; (2) powers are pervasive (given that every ability of every 
existing thing is said to depend on a power); (3) he gives a method for individuating powers. In short, 
the claims here are not likely to have arisen without deep reflection on the nature and epistemology of 
powers. Other texts suggesting that Plato had at least a moderately sophisticated theory of powers 
(whether or not he meant to endorse this theory) include Phaedrus 270c9–d7 and Sophist 247e3–4.  
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I begin by explaining the puzzle and its centrality to the argument. I next argue that 
what the two features refer to is the manifestation of a power. This view raises further 
questions:   how   can   Socrates’   formula   “being   epi  x”   be   a   way   of   referring   to   a   power’s  
manifestation, and why should Socrates use two phrases if both refer to the same 
phenomenon? Finally, I show what is gained from adopting this reading.  
Readers may be especially interested in the consequences of my argument for the 
overall argument about knowledge and opinion in this passage. The view I argue for is a 
version  of  what  Gail  Fine  calls  the  “contents  analysis”  as  against  an  “objects  analysis”:  that  
is, to say that knowledge is epi x is to say that x is the propositional content of the knowledge 
in question, rather than to say that knowledge is related to an object in the world.2 This is 
because the objects analysis applied to the epi relation says that for a power to be epi x is for 
it to be related to an entity distinct from the power itself (and distinct from its manifestation). 
As I shall argue, the numerical distinctness of a power (and its manifestation) from what it is 
epi makes the argument in the text question-begging. The contents analysis does not require 
this kind of distinctness, so the view I shall argue for, the Identity Reading, supports it. 
Finally,  it  is  widely  recognized  that  of  the  three  competing  ways  in  which  “is”  can  be  read  in  
this passage, the existential and predicative senses are natural allies of the objects analysis, 
while the veridical sense goes with the contents analysis. It follows that the Identity Reading 
is  committed  to  the  veridical  reading  of  “is”  (in  most  places),  and  to  the  contents  analysis.3 
The Passage 
Near the end of Book V Socrates proposes that philosophers should rule, explaining 
that philosophers are those who love knowledge. As a counterexample, Glaucon describes a 
group  of  “sight-lovers,”  who  seem  to  love  some forms of knowledge; Socrates counters that 
philosophers love the truth (475e4) and they must therefore love the forms.4 The sight-lovers                                                         
2 Of course this reading of being epi x does not commit its proponent to saying that there are no 
objects to which knowledge is  related;;  it  only  claims  that  the  talk  of  knowledge  being  “epi what  is”  is  
not talk about those objects.  
3 For  details  of  these  readings  and  arguments  see  Gail  Fine,  “Knowledge  and  Belief  in  Republic V”  
and  “Knowledge  and  Belief  in  Republic V–VII,”  in  Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays 
(Clarendon Press, 2003).  
4 The philosophers are also described as loving all kinds of knowledge, as opposed to loving some 
kinds but not others (474c8–75c8). This may serve partly to distinguish them from the craftspeople in 
the city, who have knowledge of their own crafts (428b7–c10), but not of things beyond their own 
occupations (434a3–b7).  
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do not even acknowledge the existence of the forms, so they fail to qualify as philosophers by 
this criterion (475e2–475d6).  
One might think the argument has now ended successfully. But Socrates embarks on a 
second argument for the same conclusion, this time addressed to the sight-lovers themselves 
(476e4–480a13). This argument shows that since knowledge and opinion are different 
powers, they are necessarily epi different things; therefore what can be known is different 
from what one can hold an opinion about. In this argument Socrates must eschew claims the 
sight-lovers would not accept, including appeals to the existence of forms.5  
Socrates interrupts this second argument to propose a theory of powers with two main 
claims. First, powers are real and are what enable us to do whatever we are able to do. 
Second, he explains how to differentiate one power from another as follows:   
A  power  (δυνάμεως)  has  no  color  for  me  to  see,  nor  a  shape,  nor  any  feature  of  the  sort  that  
many other things have, and that I can consider in order to distinguish them for myself as 
different   from  one  another.   In  the  case  of  a  power,   I   look  only  at  (εἰς  ἐκεῖνο  μόνον  βλέπω)  
[1:] what   it  deals  with   (εφ’  ᾧ ἔστι)  and   [2:] what it does (ὃ ἀπεργάζεται),  and   it   is  on   that  
basis that I come to call each the power it is: those assigned to deal with the same things and 
do the same things, I call the same; those that deal with different things and do different 
things, I call different. (477c6–d5,  Reeve’s  translation  modified)6 
The Problem 
The  individuation  of  powers  is  central  and  crucial  to  the  argument.  One  of  Socrates’  
central claims is that knowledge and opinion are two distinct powers, and hence that they are 
properly distinguished from one another. He shows that the sight-lovers do not have 
knowledge by showing that they do have opinion, that knowledge and opinion are distinct 
powers, and that knowledge has a requirement the sight-lovers cannot meet.                                                          
5 This reading of the dialectical requirements of the argument is widely accepted, with adherents 
including J. C. Gosling,  “Δόξα  and  Δύναμις  in  Plato’s  Republic,”  Phronesis 13.2 (1968): 119–130, at 
121; Julia Annas, An   Introduction   to  Plato’s   Republic (Oxford University Press, 1981); Gail Fine, 
“Knowledge  and  Belief  in  Republic V–VII,”  217.  For  disagreement  see  Vogt,  Belief and Truth, 58–
62.  
6 δυνάμεως  γὰρ  ἐγὼ οὔτε  τινὰ χρόαν  ὁρῶ οὔτε  σχῆμα  οὔτε  τι  τῶν  τοιούτων  οἷον  καὶ ἄλλων  πολλῶν,  
πρὸς  ἃ ἀποβλέπων  ἔνια  διορίζομαι  παρ΄  ἐμαυτῷ τὰ μὲν  ἄλλα  εἶναι,  τὰ δὲ ἄλλα·  δυνάμεως  δ’εἰς  ἐκεῖνο  
μόνον  βλέπω  [1:] εφ’  ᾧ τε  ἔστι  καὶ [2:] ὃ ἀπεργάζεται,  καὶ ταύτῃ ἑκάστην  αὐτῶν  δύναμιν  ἐκάλεσα,  
καὶ τὴν  μὲν  ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην  καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην  τὴν  αὐτὴν  καλῶ,  τὴν  δ’ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ 
ἕτερον   ἀπεργαζομένην   ἄλλην.   Greek   quotations   are   from   Plato,   Platonis Rempublicam, ed. S. R. 
Slings (Oxford University Press, 2003). Translations from the Republic are from C. D. C. Reeve, 
Republic, (Indianapolis, Hackett, 2004), unless otherwise noted.  
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Socrates   looks   at   two   things   to   individuate   powers:   the   first   is   εφ’  ᾧ ἐστι   (“what   a  
power is epi”  or  “deals  with”)  and  the  second  is  ὃ ἀπεργάζεται  (“what  a  power  does”).  I  shall  
later argue that these two phrases refer to the same entity, but let us begin by assuming that 
they refer to two distinct phenomena. Looking at two non-identical things gives four possible 
results:  
1. The powers are epi the same thing and do the same thing.  
2. The powers are epi different things and do different things.  
3. The powers are epi different things but do the same thing.  
4. The powers are epi the same thing but do different things. 
But in practice Socrates assumes that only (1) and (2) are possible. He is therefore 
assuming the following Constraint:  
Constraint: Distinct powers never do the same things or deal with the same things. 
This Constraint is equivalent to saying that only (1) and (2) are possible, and that (3) 
and (4) cannot occur.7  
We know that the Constraint is part of the argument for the following reasons.8 First, 
Socrates’   initial   statement   that  he   looks  at   two   things  mentions  only   cases   (1)   and   (2).  But  
second  and  more  importantly,  Socrates’  argument  about  knowledge  and  opinion  depends  on  
the Constraint. Socrates first establishes that knowledge and opinion are different powers, by 
showing that they do different things (first at 477a–b, then again at 477d–478a). He then 
infers that since they are different powers, they both do different things and are epi different 
things (478a1–5). Glaucon makes the reliance on the Constraint explicit: Socrates asks him 
whether what can be known and what can be opined might be the same. He answers that this 
is impossible (ἀδύνατον),  since  different  powers  are  always  epi different things (478a13–b2). 
It   is   important   to   note   the  modal   nature   of  Glaucon’s   claim.   It   is   not  merely   the   case   that                                                          
7 One might think that the Constraint implies not that (3) and (4) are impossible, but the weaker claim 
that neither (3) nor (4) ever in fact occur. I shall show below why the stronger version is required. 
8 The Constraint is recognized by Crombie, An   Examination   of   Plato’s   Doctrines (New York, 
Humanities Press, 1962), 57–8;;  Jaakko  Hintikka,  “Knowledge  and  Its  Objects  in  Plato,”  in  Patterns in 
Plato’s  Thought,  J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.) (Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1973), 7–18, 15; Gerasimos Santas, 
“Hintikka  on  Knowledge  and  Its  Objects  in  Plato,”  in  Patterns  in  Plato’s  Thought,  J. M. E. Moravcsik 
(ed.) (Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1973), 31–51,  44;;  Fine,  “Knowledge  and  Belief   in  Republic V,”  73–4; 
Michael  C.  Stokes,  “Plato  and   the  Sightlovers  of   the  Republic,”  Apeiron  25.4(1992): 103–32, 117; 
Francisco  Gonzalez,  “Propositions  or  Objects?  A  Critique  of  Gail  Fine  on  Knowledge and Belief in 
Republic V,”  Phronesis 41.3(1996): 245–75, 263–4;;  Ayca  Boylu,  “The  Powers  Argument  in  Plato’s  
Republic,”  History of Philosophy Quarterly 28.2(2011): 107–24, 114; It is passed over by Reeve, 
Blindness  and  Reorientation:  Problems  in  Plato’s Republic,”  (Oxford  University  Press,  2013),  135–6.  
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knowledge and opinion happen to be epi different things, in his view. Rather, no two powers 
can be epi the same thing—that is, case four above is ruled out for all powers. Glaucon 
reasons from the general fact that no two powers are epi the same thing to the particular claim 
that knowledge and opinion are not epi the same thing. Note that case (3) has not been ruled 
out, but absent some reason for thinking it is a possibility we are justified in assuming that it 
is also excluded, since as a mixed case nothing distinguishes it logically from case (4).  
It follows from the Constraint that the referent of either phrase—what a power is epi 
or what it does—suffices to individuate a power, regardless of what the other phrase refers to 
for the same power. That is, if we want to know whether two powers are the same or 
different, and we establish that they do different things, this shows that they are different 
powers without needing to check what they are epi. Likewise, if we find two powers that are 
epi different things, we again know they are different from one another without any need to 
find out what they do.  
The Constraint is puzzling, since at first glance the two features Socrates looks at 
seem  to  be  two  distinct  entities.  As  Rachel  Barney  writes,  “Plato  seems  to  offer  one  sufficient  
condition  too  many…”9 Note  that  Socrates’  remarks  about  the  individuation  of  powers  would  
create no puzzle without the Constraint. Socrates is of course free to look at as many criteria 
as he might wish to for individuating powers, and he might propose any procedure for 
making a judgment about whether two (or more) putative powers are in fact the same power. 
His view is only puzzling because he seems to posit two separate criteria, but then treats them 
as if they were in fact a single criterion.  
Since the use Socrates actually makes of the criteria is clear, the only scope for 
solving the puzzle lies in thinking about what the criteria refer to. Crombie, Gosling, and 
Hintikka all saw that the text requires that what a power is epi and what it does be related in 
some intimate way that prevents them from varying independently.10 Crombie proposes that 
what a power is epi is an   “internal   accusative,”   that   is,   the   power’s   own  manifestation   as  
named  by  a  verbal  formula  similar  to  the  power’s  own  name.  Thus,  for  example,  the  power  of                                                          9 Rachel Barney,   “Review   of   Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Volumes 1–2, 
Cambridge   University   Press   2012,”   Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, October   2013.   “[T]he  
general principle for individuating powers which is the crucial premise in the argument does not seem 
strong   enough   to   carry   the   conclusion   unless  we   suppose   gross   confusion   on  Plato’s   part”   (Santas,  
“Hintikka  on  Knowledge  and  Its  Objects   in  Plato,”  34).  See  also  Annas,  An Introduction   to  Plato’s  
Republic, 202.  
10 Crombie, An   Examination   of   Plato’s   Doctrines,   57;;   Gosling,   “Δόξα   and   Δύναμις   in   Plato’s  
Republic,”  124;;  Hintikka,  “Knowledge  and  Its  Objects  in  Plato,”  9–13.  
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opinion is epi opinions, and the power of sight would be epi things  seen.  On  Gosling’s  view,  
the two criteria refer to more or less the same phenomenon, although his description of this 
referent is not entirely clear. According to these readings the two criteria are either redundant 
or unclear: redundant if they refer to exactly the same thing, unclear if there is some 
difference we cannot discern. I will defend an account similar to those of Crombie and 
Gosling, but I shall both argue more carefully for the view and be more definite about what 
the two criteria refer to.  
Why we cannot avoid the Constraint 
Two initially plausible thoughts about the two criteria, both of which would deny the 
Constraint, either fail to fit the text or render the argument question-begging.  
First, overlooking the Constraint, one might suppose that for a power to be epi x is 
just for it to exercise its power on x, much as one might use a tool on an object.11 Just as it is 
possible to hit a wide range of things with a hammer, then, one might suppose that a typical 
power can be brought to bear on a large range of objects, so that the nature of the power in 
question plays little or no role in determining what these objects are. To say that a power is 
epi some object just means that this power is being brought to bear on that object, without 
implying any closer connection between power and object. This reading renders the argument 
question-begging. For if a power can be epi various objects, then Socrates has no reason for 
thinking that knowledge and opinion are epi different things just because they are different 
powers—yet this inference is central to his argument. I am not aware of anyone who holds 
this view in the strong form I am describing, but it is worth setting out as an extreme against 
which the next, more plausible view can be compared. Further, many authors seem to read 
the epi relation in ways that fall somewhere between this view and the next to be described: 
these authors probably would not endorse the extreme liberality of the epi relation given by 
this first view, but neither do their proposals restrict the relation between powers and objects 
to a one-to-one relation, as the following view does.  
The second view is as follows. It recognizes that what a power is epi and what it does 
cannot be completely independent of one another. But, this line of thought goes, we do not 
need a relation as strong as identity between the two criteria; what we need instead is some 
                                                        
11 Fine  refers  to  both  this  and  the  following  view  as  an  “objects  analysis”  (“Knowledge  and  Belief  in  
Republic V,”  69).   
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natural or typical connection between what the power does and what it is epi.12 I am unaware 
of a published version of precisely this idea. But many scholars say in passing that the two 
things Socrates looks at are related in a natural way, without making clear exactly what 
connection they see or how they think this renders the argument valid. These views fall 
somewhere between these two positions; these authors probably do not think the two things 
are entirely independent of one another, but in most cases they also do not claim explicitly 
that a natural connection between them will deliver the one-to-one pairing for all powers that 
is required by the argument.  
For  example,  Stokes  proposes  a  natural  pairing  of  powers  and  “provinces”  (his   term  
for what a power is epi):  
Now sight, hearing and the other senses are capacities each distinguished from the others by 
both province and effect. Notoriously you cannot see sounds, smell colours, hear tastes, touch 
smells; each sense has in that way its own province.13  
Granting   Stokes’   point   about   the   physical   senses,   nothing at all follows from this 
about   the   behavior   of   knowledge   and   opinion.   If   Socrates’   argument   rests   on   hoping   the  
sight-lovers will accept this analogy between knowledge, opinion, and the physical senses, it 
is a very bad argument.14  
Ayca Boylu makes it a matter of definition that what a power is epi is something able 
to have done to it what that power does.15 She thus wants to preserve the claim that powers 
are epi things that are distinct from the powers themselves. But this makes the Constraint a 
mystery, and it is unclear why Glaucon, let alone the sight-lovers, should or would accept this 
claim from Socrates. It is better to read the epi relation in way that allows us to understand 
why it seems immediately obvious to the sight-lovers.  
Katja Maria Vogt proposes that knowledge and opinion are naturally directed toward 
“that  which  fully  fits  and  reflects  their  natures.”16 On her view, a power can also be directed 
toward things it is not fully fitted for, but it is only said to be epi what is most appropriate for 
it. This view, too, fails to give Socrates what his argument needs. Socrates and Glaucon argue 
for the claim that opinion and knowledge do different things, and are therefore different                                                         
12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this example, and to more than one referee for suggesting 
variations of this idea.  
13 Stokes,  “Plato  and  the  Sight-Lovers  of  the  Republic,”  119–20. 
14 Gonzalez  follows  Stokes  on  this  point  (“Propositions  or  Objects,”  264).   
15 Boylu,  “The  Powers  Argument  in  Plato’s  Republic,”  120.   
16 Vogt, Belief and Truth, 64. 
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powers. But they say nothing to show that different powers must always be epi different 
things, except in giving the individuation conditions for powers. So the individuation 
conditions themselves must provide some grounds for accepting the claim; if they do not, the 
argument is question-begging. To claim that knowledge and opinion are naturally fitted to 
different things cannot show that this must be the case; yet it is the stronger claim that 
Glaucon relies on (478a13).17  
On this second type of view, then, there is at least a typical, or better, a natural 
relation between each power and what it is epi, and this is enough to secure a one-to-one 
relation  between  powers   and   their  objects.  One  might   say,   for   example,   “I   care  only   about  
this,  how  many  assets  she  has  and  what  her  purchasing  power   is.”18 Assets and purchasing 
power   are   distinct   entities,   but   naturally   correlated.   If   these   were   someone’s   criteria   for  
individuating purchasing power, one could reasonably expect that the two things mentioned 
would give the same guidance in all or nearly all situations.  
This reading seems to have some merits in fitting the text. On one hand, the two 
apparently distinct criteria Socrates mentions are kept distinct by this reading: Socrates really 
is talking about two things, what a power does and what it is epi. On the other hand, the 
reading can explain why the two things Socrates looks at speak with one voice in deciding 
whether powers are the same or distinct: if the two things are naturally associated with one 
another, looking at either is likely to bring us to the other as well. This explains why Socrates 
pays no attention to cases (3) and (4) in his argument.  
This view, however, is less successful than it first appears, for neither typical nor 
natural association are strong enough relations to justify excluding cases (3) and (4) in an 
argument about knowledge and opinion. The very least that Socrates needs is that knowledge 
and opinion are necessarily different from one another; that is, there must be no possibility 
that knowledge and opinion might be epi the same things. And even this requirement is 
probably too lenient, for it is more plausible that Glaucon and Socrates are appealing to a 
general necessity covering all powers, not one restricted to the special case of knowledge and                                                         
17 For similar treatments of the epi relation,  see  Santas,  “Hintikka  on  Knowledge  and  Its  Objects   in  
Plato,”   43–4;;   Nicholas   D.   Smith,   “Plato   on   Knowledge   as   a   Power,”   Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 38.2(2000): 145–68;;   Nicholas   D.   Smith,   “Plato   on   the   Power   of   Ignorance,”   Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy  Supplementary Volume (2012): 51–73.   Smith’s   articles   provide   an  
order of magnitude greater sophistication than any of the others, in the following sense. While most 
views can be classified as either objects or contents analyses, Smith attempts to combine both types of 
view in a single account. But the increased sophistication does not change the basic point here.  
18 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this example. 
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opinion (478a13–b2). Socrates needs it to be the case that each power is necessarily epi 
something different from every other power, and a typical or natural connection cannot 
deliver this. Absent any further considerations that would show why the two features are 
necessarily paired as they are, the argument is open to easy, even obvious counterexamples. 
Animal husbandry and butchery both seem to deal with animals, but to do different things 
with them.19 Medicine and gymnastics both deal with bodies (Gorgias 464b2–5a7).20 If this is 
the correct understanding  of  Socrates’  two  criteria,  the  argument  is  question-begging. For the 
counterexamples show that many distinct powers seem to deal with the same things, and 
Socrates provides no reason for thinking that knowledge and opinion do not form another 
case like husbandry and butchery. No merely natural pairing of what a power does with what 
it is epi will guarantee that knowledge and opinion are not epi the very same thing(s). And of 
course if Socrates is merely assuming this claim, the argument is question-begging.  
Further, on this reading the Constraint becomes an extraordinary coincidence, for 
prima facie there is no reason that two powers should not happen to work on the same sets of 
objects. If what a power does and what it is epi are really distinct from one another, it is 
extraordinary that no two powers ever do the same thing or are epi the same thing. It is even 
more surprising that Socrates and Glaucon both happen to know this extraordinary fact about 
powers without discussion. We should prefer an account able to explain why powers never 
overlap in what they do or in what they are epi, and why Socrates and Glaucon find this claim 
obviously true.  
One might read the argument as question-begging, of course, but this is to be avoided if 
possible. Such a reading is available, as Crombie, Gosling, and Hintikka all realized. Their 
proposals   gave   a  valid   argument,   but   failed   to   explain  how  and  why  Socrates’   two  criteria  
could be read as referring to the same target. This difficulty can be solved by paying more 
attention to the fact that Socrates is discussing powers.  
Socrates on Powers 
In contemporary philosophy a power is a property whose nature is to enable whatever                                                         
19 Fine,  “Knowledge  and  Belief  in  Republic V,”  73. 
20 While medicine and gymnastics make an intuitively plausible example, note that Plato himself is 
careful in the Gorgias to avoid saying that medicine and athletics are two powers. Instead he describes 
them as a single craft with two parts. The same passage describes other practices that also deal with 
the body, that is pastry-baking and cosmetics, but these are called empirical   “knacks”   that   do   not  
qualify as crafts—and so, one suspects, they are also not genuine powers. This treatment is consistent 
with the view that Plato avoided commitment to distinct powers that would be epi the same things.  
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has it to bring about some change or to do something; the change it is directed toward is its 
manifestation.21 For example, the power of heating is the property enabling its bearer to raise 
the temperature of things in the vicinity; its manifestation is the increase in temperature.22  
Socrates’   δυνάμεις   in   this   passage   are   recognizable   as   powers   in   the contemporary 
sense by their dispositionality: they are what enable their bearers to do whatever they are able 
to do.23 In   the   same   way,   the   second   “thing”   he   looks   at   to   individuate   powers,   “what   it  
does”,  seems  to  describe  the  power’s  manifestation.24  
On the Identity Reading, saying that a power is epi x means that x is its manifestation. 
Thus, when Socrates apparently gives two criteria for individuating powers, in fact both 
criteria refer to the same phenomenon. This is the reason that cases (3) and (4) cannot arise. 
This solves the logical problem, but to make the reading convincing we need to show that the 
text supports this approach. In the following section I give three further arguments for this 
reading, and then consider three objections.  
Three Reasons, Three Objections 
The first reason favoring the Identity Reading is that Socrates introduces the two 
phrases  by  saying,  “In   the  case  of  a  power,   I   look  only  at   that thing (ἐκεῖνο),  what   it  deals  
with  and  what  it  does…”  (477d1–2,  Reeve’s  translation  modified).  The  singular  ἐκεῖνο  refers  
to both phrases together, and so may indicate that they refer to a single thing. Further, 
Socrates’  expression  has   the  same  structure  as  a  hendiadys, the rhetorical trope by which a                                                         
21 See Vogt, Belief and Truth, 63. Of course, not all powers need bring about changes as opposed to 
properties.   But   since   we   are   discussing   Plato’s  metaphysics,   and   change   (γένεσις)   is   for   Plato   the  
mark of becoming as opposed to the realm of Forms, it seems likely that Plato does conceive of all 
powers as bringing about changes. Contemporary thinkers are exploring a number of ways of thinking 
about powers in detail (for several of these views see Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of 
Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, New York: Routledge, 2010); I am not assuming 
the correctness of any of these.  22 Alexander Bird, Nature’s  Metaphysics:  Laws  and  Properties  (Oxford University Press, 2007), 3. 
23 Socrates   says   that   powers   are   αἷς   δὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς   δυνάμεθα   ἃ δυνάμεθα   καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν   ὅτι   περ   ἂν  
δύνηται,  “that  by  means  of  which  we  are  able  to  do  what  we  are  able  to  do,  as  well  as  everything  else  
whatever  it  can  do”  (477c1–2, my translation).  
24 Is  Socrates   really   thinking  of   δυνάμεις   as  properties?   “Property”  here  means   a  way   something is 
which gives it the ability to bring about some change: in this sense Socrates is discussing properties. 
Socrates later speaks of the power of sight coming to be in the eye, corroborating the view that he is 
thinking of powers as properties possessed by things (508a–b).  Second,  in  what  follows,  “potential”  
and   related   terms   are   based   on   Socrates’   heavy   use   of   δύναμις   and   related   words,   combined   with  
contemporary thinking about powers; these are not attempts to read Aristotelian concepts back into 
Plato. I am grateful to anonymous reviewers for raising these issues.  
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speaker  uses   two  words  or  phrases   to   indicate  a   single   thing,   as   in,   “by   length  of   time  and  
siege,”  meaning  simply  “a  long  siege.”25 Hendiadys typically places the more specific of the 
two  items  last,  and  Socrates’ two phrases observe this pattern as well, suggesting that the best 
guide   to   the  meaning  of   “what   a  power   is   epi”   is   “what   a  power  does.”  These   reasons   are  
suggestive, but not decisive.26  
The second reason favoring the Identity Reading depends on noting where each 
phrase occurs in the passage. Socrates speaks several times of knowledge, opinion, and even 
ignorance as epi this or that.27 He sometimes adds additional words beyond the epi + dative 
phrase, which seem to say what the powers in question do (ὃ ἀπεργάζεται).   For   example,  
“Now,  doesn’t  knowledge  naturally  deal  with  what  is  (ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι),  to  know  how  what  is  is?  
(γνῶναι  ὡς  ἔστι  τὸ ὄν)”  (477b11–12).  Here  “to  know  how  what  is  is”,  seems  to  describe  what  
the power of knowledge does.28  
The first time Socrates says that knowledge is epi what   is,   he   says,   “Then,   since  
knowledge dealt with (ἦν)  what  is,  ignorance  must  deal  with  what  is  not…”  (477a10).  This  is  
slightly puzzling: although this is the first time Socrates has used the epi + dative 
construction about knowledge, he is saying that he and Glaucon have already agreed that 
knowledge is epi what is. The puzzle is easily solved: the earlier statement is a few lines 
above, immediately after Socrates has proposed that they find something to say to the sight-
lovers. That exchange runs:  
                                                        25 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920) citing 
Demosthenes   19.123,   χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ.  Traditionally,   “hendiadys”   refers   to   pairs   of   individual  
words,  not  entire  phrases.  See  David  Sansone,  “On  Hendiadys  in  Greek,”  Glotta 62.1–2(1984): 16–
25; T. M. Robinson notes two instances of hendiadys proper in the Timaeus, at 29d7–e1 and 29e4 
(Cosmos as Art Object, Binghampton, New York, Global Academic Publishing, 2004, 5 and 47 note 
9).  
26 They are not decisive because the two phrases might also refer to two distinct phenomena: see 
further below. Stokes argues that ἐκεῖνο  is  singular  in  order  to  contrast  with   the  colors,  shapes,  etc.  
mentioned in the previous sentence  (“Plato  and  the  Sightlovers  of  the  Republic,”  122  n.14),  but  this  is  
inconclusive, since it does not show that its grammatical number fails to reflect the number of what it 
refers to.  
27 Socrates uses the epi + dative construction at 477a11, b8, b11, d2, d3, and d5, 478a4, a7, and 480a1, 
and Glaucon uses it at 478a13. For a defence of the claim that ignorance is a power in this 
passage  see  Smith,  “Plato  on  the  Power  of  Ignorance.” 
28 Gosling  agrees   (“Δόξα  and  Δύναμις   in  Plato’s  Republic,”  125).  Two  further  examples  of  
this pattern: ᾿Εφ’  ἑτέρῳ ἄρα  ἕτερόν  τι  δυναμένη  ἑκατέρα  αὐτῶν  πέφυκεν;;  (“Each  of  them,  then,  since  
it  has  a  different  power,  deals  by  nature  with  something  different?”  478a4–5) and ᾿Επιστήμη  μὲν  γὲ 
που  ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι,  τὸ ὄν  γνῶναι  ὡς  ἔχει;;  (“Surely  knowledge  deals  with  what  is,  to  know  what  is  as  it  
is?”  478a7).  Here  ἕτερόν  τι  δυναμένη  and  τὸ ὂν  γνῶναι  ὡς  ἔχει  express  what  these  powers  do. 
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Does   someone   who   knows   know   something   or   nothing?   …[H]e   knows   something.   —
Something that is or something that is not? (ὂν  ἢ οὐκ  ὄν)  —That is. (476e6–77a1) 
 
These must be the lines that justify Socrates’   statement   a   few   lines   below   that  
knowledge  “dealt  with  what  is,”  for  there  is  no  earlier  mention  of  “what  is”  or  “what  is  not”  
in relation to knowledge.  
Glaucon’s  answer,  that  one  who  knows  must  know  something  that  is  (476e6–477a1), 
is prompted by the verb  “knows”  and  nothing  else.  Since  what  the  power  of  knowledge  does  
is knowing, the remainder of the phrase—“knowing  something  [that   is]”—must be the part 
that designates what the power is epi. So knowing what the power of knowledge does (i.e. 
knowing) suffices for knowing what it is epi (i.e. something that is, or knowing something 
that is). Glaucon has therefore inferred from what knowledge does to what it is epi without 
the aid of any further information or prompting. Now if Glaucon understands a power’s  doing  
x and being epi y as referring to the same entity or activity, his inference is understandable 
and justified. If he thinks of the two criteria as referring to different entities, however, his 
reasoning is unjustified.  
Note that this is a different point from the one made above, where I argued that 
according to Glaucon no two powers do or are epi the same things (478a13–b2). The former 
point was about a general claim applying to all powers. But the current argument concerns 
the inference Glaucon draws specifically from what knowledge does to what it is epi.  
There are two ways Glaucon might draw this inference: he might have views 
specifically   about  knowledge  which  he  uses   to   answer  Socrates’  questions,   or  he  might  be  
drawing an inference based on his general views about all powers. Suppose, first, that he is 
answering based on his prior beliefs about knowledge, so that no general views about powers 
are involved.29 In  this  case  Glaucon’s  inference  from  “knowledge  knows”  to  “knowledge  is  
epi what   is”  is   justified  by  this  prior  belief,  but  he  has  no  justification  for  going  on  to  infer  
that opinion must be epi something different from what knowledge is epi (477b8–10). On this 
reading, the sight-lovers should probably not accept Glaucon’s  answers  as  representing  their  
views, for he has no principled reason for his answers, merely some particular beliefs that 
play  directly  into  Socrates’  hands.   
It is therefore better to understand Glaucon as basing his answers on a general view 
about the nature of powers, in spite of the fact that Socrates has not yet articulated his method                                                         
29 Since Glaucon is answering for the sight-lovers, any beliefs he expresses about knowledge should 
also be attributed to them at this point. 
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for  individuating  powers.  If  Glaucon’s  answers  are  based  on  a  general  view  about  powers,  it  
is plausible that the sight-lovers would accept his answers on the grounds that they express a 
common and plausible understanding of powers. This supposition is strengthened by the end 
of   Socrates’   speech   about   individuating   powers:   after   explaining   his   method,   he   asks  
Glaucon,  “What  about  you?  How  do  you  do   it?”30 The present tense suggests that Glaucon 
already has a view about individuating powers, and Glaucon answers that he individuates 
them the same way.31 Finally, if Glaucon is reasoning based on a general view, we have 
already seen that the identity relation is needed to justify the move between what a power 
does and what it is epi.  
The third reason favoring the Identity Reading involves a difference between states 
and powers. One may be in a state of happiness about various things, and conversely one may 
be in various states about the fact that today is Tuesday. Most states are not correlated one-to-
one with objects, but on many conceptions of powers a power and its manifestation are 
correlated one-to-one. This is because powers are typically individuated by nothing but their 
manifestations.32 Note that one might plausibly read Socrates as making just this point when 
he says that powers cannot be individuated by looking at colors or shapes, as one does with 
other entities (477c6–d1). The power of sight, for example, is the power that produces seeing 
as its manifestation; therefore any power producing this manifestation is the same power, and 
any power producing another manifestation is a different power.  
If one starts by thinking of knowledge and opinion as states, it is easy to assume that 
they deal with external, independent objects. This thought leads naturally to the objects 
analysis, treating what a power does as numerically distinct from what the same power is epi. 
Recognizing that knowledge and opinion are powers, on the other hand, we should expect 
that what each power is epi is not independent from what the power does. The third reason 
favoring the Identity Reading, then, is the suspicion that competing readings fail to take                                                         
30 τί  δὲ σύ;;  πῶς  ποιεῖς;;  (478d5–6, my translation). 
31 This claim, of course, is defeasible. Socrates might be ironically inviting Glaucon or the sight-
lovers to claim a view that Glaucon has never thought about before. But Glaucon does not express 
surprise or confusion, as he often does in other parts of the Republic. I see no positive reason for 
thinking that Glaucon and the sight-lovers   could  not   recognize   in  Socrates’  words   a  view that they 
already hold. 32 George Molnar, Powers (Stephen  Mumford  ed.,  Oxford  University  Press,  2003),  60:  “A  power’s  
type  identity  is  given  by  its  definitive  manifestation.”  See  also  John  Heil,  From an Ontological Point 
of View (Oxford University Press, 2003), 81–2. A separate issue is whether the manifestation is the 
same thing as the power that produces it. On this question I do not see enough evidence in the text to 
attribute either view to Plato.  
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sufficient notice that knowledge and opinion are powers and not merely states.  
Three objections to the Identity Reading have been raised in recent scholarship, but 
none present serious difficulties.  
First, Boylu rejects the Identity Reading on the grounds that it would commit Socrates 
to the existence of something that both is and is not as soon as he introduces the claim that 
opinion is a power that opines, while later passages show him still intending to argue for this 
claim (478e).33 On my reading, however, there is no such commitment. Instead, Socrates 
begins by identifying the power of opinion by what it does, producing opinion or opining. He 
then looks for what this power is epi, that is, its manifestation under a different description.  
Second, Santas objects that at 477c6–d6, in describing his method of individuation, 
Socrates repeats his two phrases three times within one sentence. Santas takes this to show 
that two distinct referents must be intended.34 At most, however, the repetition shows that 
Socrates finds something significant or useful about using both phrases rather than just one; 
this falls far short of showing that they must refer to two distinct things.  
Third,   Ian   Crystal   argues   that   the   use   of   τε…καί   shows   that   there   are   two   distinct  
referents,  writing  that  this  connective  “…is  standard  Greek  for  expressing  two  distinct  things.  
It   emphasizes   their   difference”.35 This   is   one   way   an   author   might   use   τε…καί,   but   even  
granting that the phrase emphasizes some difference between the things connected, we still 
need to ask what difference   this   is.   Since   this   is   precisely   the   question   at   issue,   Crystal’s  
suggestion fails to rule out my reading.  
Further, a nearby passage, 474d1–5e1, provides at least one — and probably more 
than one — counterexample  to  Crystal’s  claim.36 This passage pairs several verbal formulae,                                                         
33 Boylu,  “The  Powers  Argument  in  Plato’s  Republic,”  115–17. 
34 Santas,   “Hintikka  on  Knowledge  and   Its  Objects   in  Plato,”  38.  Socrates  gives   the   two  phrases  at  
477d2, and then repeats them at 477d3–4 and d4–5.  35 Ian Crystal,  “Parmenidean  Allusions  in  Republic  V,”  Ancient Philosophy 16(1996): 351–63, 354. 
Neither Smyth, Greek Grammar §2974 nor J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (2nd edition, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1954), 511–13  supports  Crystal’s  claim  about  the  connective’s  function.  Moreover,  
Smyth cites Electra 36 as a standard example   of   hendiadys,   and   Archibald   Allen   (“A   Double  
Hendiadys   in   Sophocles,”   Glotta 60.3–4, 1982, 235) adds Trachinian Women 764 and Oedipus 
Tyrannus 541:  all  use  τε…καί.   
36 From  474d1  to  475e1  Plato  uses  καί  or  τε…καί  eight  times:  at  474d3  (twice),  d4,  e3, 475a1, a11 
(twice),   and  d5.  For   example,  Socrates   says   that   “boys   in   the  bloom  of  youth   somehow  manage   to  
sting  and  arouse  (δάκνουσί  τε  καὶ κινοῦσι)  a  passionate  lover  of  boys”  (474d3).  Although  the  words  
“sting”  and  “arouse”  have  different  connotations, there is no difference in the phenomenon they refer 
to.  They  merely  describe  it  in  two  ways.  Verdenius  observes  that  epexegesis  “is  a  common  feature  of  
Plato’s  style”,  referring  also  to  Riddell’s  collection  of examples.  See  W.  J.  Verdenius,  “Epexegesis 
in  Plato,”  Mnemosyne 33.3–4 (Fourth Series, 1980), 351–3, 352, James Riddell, The Apology of Plato, 
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and in a few cases the two clearly refer to the same thing. Plato, then, uses these connectives 
to join terms referring to identical items as well as terms referring to numerically distinct 
items. It is a further question whether expressions thus connected refer to the same or distinct 
objects.  
The objections to the Identity Reading are therefore weak. But we also need solutions 
to two further problems.  
The first asks how saying that a power is epi x can be a way of referring to that 
power’s  manifestation.  That  is,  it  is  far  from  obvious  that  “what  a  power  is  epi”  is  a  way  of  
referring   to   that   power’s  manifestation;;  we   need   to   show   that   understanding   it   this  way   is  
plausible. The second problem is closely related: if both phrases   do   refer   to   a   power’s  
manifestation, why does Socrates use two phrases — why not just talk about what a power 
does, and omit the phrase with epi?37  
The objects analysis may seem to have an advantage on this question, since one 
thing’s  being  epi another  seems  to  indicate  a  relation  between  two  different  items.  “x is epi y”  
can   be   translated   “x is upon, over, or against y”  — so one does not expect x and y to be 
related   as   part   to   whole   or   as   source   to   product.   Since   a   power’s   manifestation   is   easily 
thought of as part of or a product of the power itself, the Identity Reading seems to conflict 
with the epi phrase.  
Since the Identity Reading claims that what a power does is the same as what it is epi, 
this could sound as if the power of knowledge produces the forms — clearly an absurd 
result.38 But this would only follow if combined with an objects analysis; on the contents 
analysis this does not follow.  
The next step in solving this problem is to show that the preposition epi can support 
this reading. The epi + dative construction occurs many times in this passage without ἐστι,  so  
it should be possible to understand the sense of the preposition without pinning down the 
sense of the verb.39                                                                                                                                                                              
with a Revised Text and English Notes, and a Digest of Platonic Idioms (Oxford University Press, 
1867), §§204–30, but especially §§216, 205 B note.  
37 “An  adequate  interpretation…must  explain  both  (1)  how  the  two  phrases  for  distinguishing  between  
powers are related and (2)  why  they  are  introduced  as  distinct  phrases”  (Gonzalez,  “Propositions  or  
Objects,”  267).  Cf.  Gosling,  “Δόξα  and  Δύναμις  in  Plato’s  Republic,”  124.   
38 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
39 The epi + dative construction is found at 477a11, b8, b11, d2, d3, and d5, 478a4, a7, a13, and 
480a1. Vogt, Belief and Truth, 62–3,   includes   the  verb  τάσσω   in  her  analysis of these expressions, 
reaching results very similar to mine.  
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The  most  plausible  candidates  for   the  best  reading  of  επί  are domain and purpose.40 
The phrase may indicate a domain, the set of objects a power acts on or interacts with in 
order to produce its manifestations. One can take this to mean that sight, for example, is epi 
the domain of visible objects.41 But the idea of purpose deserves a hearing, since Luraghi 
observes  that  this  meaning  “is  mostly  triggered  by  the  occurrence  of  abstract  nouns”  ,  and  the  
phrase ἐφ’  ᾧ ἐστι  is  an  abstraction  par excellence.42 On this approach one might translate ἐφ’  
ᾧ ἐστι  as  “the  [purpose]  for  which  [a  power]  is,”  or  “a  power’s  purpose.”   
The reading of ἐπί  as  indicating  purpose  shows  that  the  Identity  Reading’s  solution  is  
viable: the phrase ἐφ’  ᾧ ἐστι   is   plausibly   read   as  describing  a  power’s  purpose,   that   is,   its  
manifestation. Further, on this reading we can also see why the domain reading (or objects 
analysis) has seemed obviously right. If powers are conceived as distinct from their own 
manifestations, then it follows that what a power is epi is also distinct from the power itself.43 
It is undeniably easy to form the impression, when reading this part of the Respublica, that 
what powers are epi is something distinct from the powers themselves. This may motivate 
some of the plausibility of the objects analysis. But it now turns out that the contents analysis 
can explain this impression as well: what knowledge and opinion do, and are epi, are the 
same entity, and this entity is distinct from the power that gives rise to it. Insofar as we have 
merely an impression that in discussing the epi relation, Socrates is referring to entities 
numerically distinct from the powers that produce them, this impression should be counted in 
favor neither of the objects nor of the contents analysis, since it is equally explained by both 
views.  
Finally, if both phrases refer to the same thing, why not just use one phrase? I answer 
that the epi expressions  refer  to  a  power’s  manifestation  prospectively,  that  is,  as  something  
the power is directed toward but is not at the moment actually producing. This gives the epi 
expression  a  force  in  the  same  neighborhood  as,  but  not  necessarily  the  same  as,  Aristotle’s  
“potential.”44                                                          40 Silvia Luraghi, On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases: the Expression of Semantic Roles in 
Ancient Greek (Amsterdam, J. Benjamins, 2003), 298–302 and LSJ s.v. ἐπί,  B.I.1.b  for  the  idea of a 
domain; B.III.2 for purpose. Of course ἐπί  is  capable  of  more  shades  of  meaning  than  those  I  list  here,  
but these are the most plausible choices.  
41 Reeve, Blindness and Reorientation, 135–6. 
42 Luraghi, On the Meaning of Prepositions and Cases, 302. 
43 This view is at least suggested in Book I at 346e.  
44 I  have  avoided  the  word  “potential,”  except  here,  so  as  not  to  imply  that  Plato’s  sense  of  “being  epi 
x”  is  the  same  as  Aristotle’s  sense  of  “potential.”  Such  a  claim  would  prejudge  many  questions  and  is  
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One   sentence   in   particular   reveals   the   semantic   difference   between   Socrates’   two  
phrases. Socrates asks, 
Each of them, then, since it has a different power, is epi something different?  
᾿Εφ’   ἑτέρῳ ἄρα   ἕτερον   τι   δυναμένη   ἑκατέρα   αὐτῶν   πέφυκεν;;   (478a4,   Reeve’s   translation  
modified). 
The   phrases   “᾿Εφ’   ἑτέρῳ”   and   “ἕτερον   τι   δυναμένη”   seem   to   express   the   same  
meaning: to be epi something is the same as to be able (δυναμένη)  to  do  something.  In  order  
to  make  the  two  phrases  semantically  equivalent,  Plato  has  added  the  word  δυναμένη  to  the  
second. That is, the wording shows that being epi something is not equivalent to doing 
something, but rather to being able to do something. This supports the view that ἐφ’   ᾧ 
expresses  an  ability  or   tendency   to  do  something,  while   “what  a  power  does”  expresses  an  
actual doing.  
The two phrases therefore refer to the same phenomenon, but pick it out in different 
ways. The epi phrase  refers  to  a  power’s  manifestation  prospectively,  leaving  aside  whether  
the  power   is   actually   producing   the   it.   “What   a   power  does”   refers   to   the  manifestation   as  
actually produced, and therefore as something tangible and observable: the prefix ἀπο- in 
ἀπεργάζεται   emphasizes   the   finished,   completed   aspect   of   the  manifestation   (LSJ   s.v.   ἀπό  
D.2).  
The difference can also be illustrated in English. Consider a radiator whose power to 
heat produces the manifestation of heating.45 We can think about either what its power is for 
or what it does: both refer to its power to heat, but the first is not committed to thinking of the 
power  as  actually  manifesting.   If  one  points  to  a  cold  radiator  and  asks,  “What  is  this  for?”  
one can answer that  it  is  for  heating.  On  the  other  hand,  if  one  asks  ,  “What  is  this  radiator  
doing?”   one   can   only   answer   that   it   is   heating   if   it   is   actually   heating.   Yet   both   ways   of  
talking  refer  to  the  same  manifestation,  heating.  Socrates’  use  of  both  phrases  may  be  a way 
of emphasizing that powers are real regardless of whether they are currently producing their 
manifestations.  
Further Results 
Four additional aspects of the text are also explained better by the Identity Reading.  
First,   this   approach   makes   Socrates’   standard for having knowledge somewhat less                                                                                                                                                                             
almost certainly false.  
45 This is an illustration of the view, not an argument for it. Such an argument would be faulty, since 
the example depends to some extent  on  the  English  present  progressive  tense  (“is  doing”).   
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demanding than it would otherwise be, and this makes it easier for him to claim that there 
would be philosophers available to rule the ideal city. Socrates has claimed that philosophers 
should rule in answer to a challenge by Glaucon that he should show that his ideal city was 
possible, and how it was possible (471c6–7, e3–4); soon after our passage Socrates 
recognizes that the nature required for philosophers is rare (502a–503d).46 Socrates makes 
significant progress toward this goal by analyzing knowledge as a power. For someone has 
the power of knowledge if she is able to know what is; therefore having knowledge does not 
require that one has already actually come to know what is.47 Since actually knowing certain 
forms (e.g. The Good) may be very difficult, treating knowledge as a power may amount to a 
significant softening of the requirement.48 This also helps explain why Glaucon acquiesces so 
easily when Socrates offers his views about powers: it is not just that he is friendly to 
Socrates’   argument,   but   he   may   also   see   that   the   bar   for   achieving   knowledge   is   being  
lowered.  
One   might   object   that   Socrates’   goal   is,   on   the   contrary,   to   make   knowledge   more 
difficult, in order to exclude the sight-lovers. This is one of his goals, but if he achieves it by 
making knowledge too difficult, knowledge will be such a rare achievement that this will 
become an objection against the possibility of his city. Socrates in fact excludes the sight-
lovers not by setting a degree of difficulty they cannot meet, but by the absolute criterion that 
they lack knowledge — and they lack knowledge because they lack the power of knowing the 
forms. Given this method of excluding them, it is to Socrates' advantage to make the criterion 
for having knowledge less demanding, in order to make the availability of rulers for the city 
more plausible. Defining knowledge modally, as the ability to know the forms, gives Socrates                                                         
46 There   is  a  debate  over  exactly  how   to  understand   this  challenge  and  Socrates’   response.  But   this  
much is clear: Socrates has a motivation for making the possibility requirement easier to meet, and on 
my   reading   his   argument   does   this.   See  Mason  Marshall,   “The   Possibility   Requirement   in   Plato’s  
Republic,”  Ancient Philosophy 28.1(2008): 71–85. 
47 This claim is contrary to what is usually assumed, namely that Socrates thinks knowledge involves 
actually   grasping   or   coming   into   contact   with   its   object.   For   example,   “Only   philosophers   have  
knowledge…because  only   they  know  forms…”  (Fine,  “Knowledge  and  Belief   in  Republic V,”  67);;  
“In  short,  knowledge  is  here  understanding  and acquaintance, understanding achievable only in direct 
acquaintance   with   certain   objects…”   (Gonzalez,   “Propositions   or   Objects?”   258);;   “…the   work   of  
episteme is to make perfect cognitive contact with that which admits of only perfect cognitive 
contact…”  (Boylu,  “The  Powers  Argument in  Plato’s  Republic,”  120).   
48 How can Socrates reduce his argumentative burden by adding the epi phrase, if both phrases refer to 
the same referent? The first phrase allows us to identify the power of knowledge if we can ascertain 
that it is aimed at the right kind of manifestation, just as we can identify a seed as an onion seed if we 
can ascertain that it is aimed at becoming an onion plant. The seed need not be an onion plant now in 
order to be so identified. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.  
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an ideal combination of claims: the wrong sort of people are absolutely excluded, while the 
right sort have their way eased.  
Further, this advantage is only available to the Identity Reading. Readings employing 
the objects analysis (associated with reading ἐστι   existentially   or   predicatively)   are  
committed to reading the epi relation as a relation between a power and some objects that the 
power works on, or works with. But on this approach, Socrates is not drawing attention to the 
problem of how to identify a power even before it is actually producing its manifestation. 
Readings employing the objects analysis, therefore, have no room to recognize any softening 
of the knowledge requirement for the philosopher-kings. The text, moreover, shows a strong 
concern  with  the  practicality  of  Socrates’  ideal  rulers,  and  more  specifically with the question 
whether   there   will   be   enough   uncorrupted   philosophers   in   a   city   to   implement   Socrates’  
ideas. On my reading, one way Socrates responds to this concern is by defining knowledge in 
a way that makes it easier to find philosophers, without sacrificing their other desirable 
qualities.  
Second, the semantic difference between the two phrases (what a power does and 
what it is epi)  can  explain  why  Socrates’  descriptions  of  knowledge  and  opinion  constantly  
mention ability or possibility. Socrates describes  the  lover  of  sights  and  sounds  as  “unable to 
see   the  …beautiful   itself”;;   the   same   person   “would   not   be   able to   follow  …”;;   finally,   the  
person   with   knowledge   “is   able to observe both [the Beautiful itself] and the things that 
participate  in  it.”49 These terms for possibility and ability are central to the passage. A person 
without the power of knowledge does not just happen not to see the forms, but is unable to 
see them because she lacks the power that does this. Philosophers and sight-lovers are 
defined throughout the passage not by what they do but by what they are capable of doing. 
On the Identity Reading, this nuance acquires a clear point and does work in the argument.  
The objects analysis cannot explain this emphasis on modality in the straightforward 
way I have just suggested. For on the objects analysis, the epi phrase has nothing to do with 
modality.  So  while  Socrates’  other  modal  language  indicates  his  concern  with  modality,  the  
objects reading cannot show any way in which he answers this concern in his treatments of 
knowledge and opinion.  
Third, this view can also explain why Socrates emphasizes that the sight-lovers deny 
the very existence of the forms, and correspondingly that philosophers believe in forms.50                                                         
49 ἀδύνατος;;  μήτε…δυνάμενος;;  δυνάμενος  (476b7,  c2,  c8,  my  emphasis).   
50 That the philosopher believes in forms, ἡγούμενός   τι   αὐτὸ καλὸν,   is   the   first   point   describing  
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Had he not described these people as denying the existence of the forms, it would have 
remained unclear whether they were capable of seeing forms. Instead, the sight-lovers are 
defined largely by their denial that the forms exist: Socrates mentions this denial repeatedly 
throughout our passage. Now it is natural to think that if someone does not believe in a non-
physical  thing,  then  she  is  incapable  of  “seeing”  it.51 Since Socrates has defined knowledge as 
being able to see the forms, he has a clear way of excluding the sight-lovers from knowledge. 
For they would have to acknowledge that the forms exist in order to have any chance of 
“seeing”   them;;   and   in   taking   this   first   step,   they   would   no   longer   be   the   kind   of   people  
Socrates and Glaucon are addressing here.  
This point, too, depends on the Identity Reading of the epi phrase. On this reading, we 
know that philosophers are capable of seeing the forms because they have a power, 
knowledge, which is epi what is, and to be epi what is just means that the power is directed 
toward truth even if it is not at a given moment actually producing truths. On the objects 
analysis, by contrast, for knowledge to be epi what is means that it is applied to, or works in 
conjunction  with  the  forms.  On  this  reading,  Socrates’  use  of  epi is unrelated to the issue of 
belief in or acknowledgement of the forms. The objects analysis is therefore unable to shed 
any light on the modal way Socrates defines the sight-lovers and the philosophers.  
Fourth, Socrates needs to introduce the epi phrase because of the logic of his dispute 
with the sight-lovers. Since these people are angry because he has denied that they have 
knowledge, they themselves must think that they do or might have knowledge. Thus, any 
putative example of knowledge Socrates might appeal to would likely be disputed, since in 
Socrates’  view  a  form  will  be  involved,  but  the  sight-lovers deny that there are such things. 
So if Socrates had defined the power of knowledge only by what it does, he would be 
restricted to discussing what some given power had actually managed to do. This is the 
position he must be in according to the objects analysis. This would mean finding cases in 
which the power of knowledge has actually managed to know something: but what this power 
has accomplished, or in which cases it has accomplished this, is precisely what is under 
dispute. Socrates will not agree that the power exercised by the sight-lovers is knowledge,                                                                                                                                                                             
someone   who   is   “awake”   (476c7);;   the   sight-lover   is   someone   μήτε   νομίζων   (476c1–2); the non-
philosophers’  disbelief  is  brought  in  twice,  with  heavy  rhetorical  emphasis,  at  the  end  of  the  argument  
(479a1–2 and a3–4). Stokes notes that it is unclear why the sight-lovers are both unable and unwilling 
to recognize the forms (Stokes,  “Plato  and  the  Sightlovers  of  the  Republic,”  125–6).  
51 Rowe, Philosophical Writing, 210.  Of  course  “seeing”  here  is  a  metaphor  for  knowing,  or  possibly  
for knowing that something exists. I am claiming only that this is an understandable assumption, not 
that it is justified in this or any other case.  
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and they will not agree that there are such things as the forms, so they will hardly admit that a 
power attempting to see the forms, or partnering with them, is knowledge.52 This impasse 
may  explain  Socrates’   interrupting  himself   at  477b12–13,   saying,  “But   first   I   think  we  had  
better  go  through  the  following.”   
What he gains by giving the theory of powers is mainly the ability to differentiate 
powers based on what they are epi, what they would do if they were to reach their ends 
unhindered. He then uses the ἐφ’  ᾧ ἐστι  phrase   to   show   that   there   is   a  difference  between  
knowledge and opinion. For example, one of the key moves in the argument about knowledge 
and opinion comes at 478a4–b4, where the question is whether knowledge and opinion can 
be epi the same thing(s). Socrates establishes that they must be epi different things, and 
therefore that opinion cannot be epi “what   is”;;   this   launches   the  argument   into  a  search  for  
what opinion is epi.  
For all four of these points, the advantages claimed for the Identity Reading might 
seem equally available to the objects analysis. In a sense this is true, but it is important to 
note that these explanations are vague and generic on the objects analysis. On the Identity 
Reading, by contrast, we can point to the specific language, lines, and argumentative moves 
by which Socrates responds to all four of these concerns, and we see precisely how the epi 
phrase helps him deal with each issue.  
Conclusions 
I have argued that what seem to be two independent phrases for individuating powers 
are in fact different ways of referring to the manifestation-type of a power. The first phrase, 
ἐφ’  ᾧ ἐστι,  emphasizes  a  power’s  ability  rather  than  what  it  has  actually  accomplished.  The  
second, ὃ ἀπεργάζεται,  refers  to  the  same  manifestation,  but  as  something  actually  produced.  
This reading solves the logical problem arising on the objects analysis: it can explain why 
each phrase is sufficient by itself to individuate a power and the two phrases cannot give 
conflicting guidance. Second, I have shown how to read being epi x in the passage. The best 
sense for epi in this passage is the idea of purpose rather than domain. Third, this proposal 
explains what Socrates gains by introducing both phrases rather than relying on one or the 
other. He gains flexibility in saying who might qualify as a philosopher-king, as well as the 
ability to absolutely exclude the sight-lovers from their pretense to rule.  
Finally, this view of knowledge comports well with that presented in the Symposium,                                                         
52 Rowe makes a similar observation at Philosophical Writing, 206. 
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where the philosopher is between ignorance and knowledge. There is a theoretical slot 
available for a sage who has reached fully actualized knowledge of the forms, but that text 
makes clear that the philosophers we are likely to encounter will not be like that. Instead, they 
will have achieved some partial grasp of some forms, but they will count as philosophers 
largely in virtue of having the power to make progress toward more complete manifestations 
of knowledge.53  
 
Brian D. Prince 
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